FSB General about attack in Khabarovsk: ''It could be any city where there is a law enfrocement's receiving office''
Aleksandr Mikhailov shared his opinion on the attack on the building of the agency in the Far East
The attack took place in Khabarovsk on 21 April, which is striking in its audacity. A young man at 17.02 p.m. local time (10 a.m. MSK) entered the reception office of FSB in the city and opened fire. According to preliminary data, two people killed. The shooter was also eliminated. The center of Khabarovsk, where the building is located, was virtually paralyzed. The streets were blocked off by law enforcement. Parked cars were inspected by police officers with dogs. Banks, offices, shops were closed. People from institutions were evacuated. Almost immediately the identity of the attacker was established. As reported by law enforcement, it was a native and resident of Khabarovsk Krai A. V. Konev, born in 1999. It was also reported that he belonged to a neo-Nazi group. About how the criminal was free to commit an action in one of the most guarded power structures, why this happened in Khabarovsk and what effects to expect — in the comments of Major General of Federal Security Service in the reserve Aleksandr Mikhailov.
Aleksander Georgievich, can the attack on the reception office of the FSB be related to the recent terrorist attacks?
The thing is that receiving offices of such power structures have always been a subject of aspirations of not only of intruders but simply abnormal people. We have repeatedly encountered with such things: in the Soviet times we had a blast at the receiving office of the KGB, we had attacks on receiving offices by sick people in the period of my service in the KGB — a schizophrenic forced his way into the office with a knife.
Why has the attacker managed to enter the building and open fire?
It is a demonstratory action aimed directly at the power structure, and it is necessary to keep in mind that no equipment, except for investigative, intelligence and agent-operational, prevents every incident. A person entered the reception office, and not even passing a so-called zone of control he opened fire.
''We have repeatedly encountered with such things: in the Soviet times we had a blast at the receiving office of the KGB, we had attacks on receiving offices by sick people in the period of my service in the KGB — a schizophrenic broke into the office with a knife.'' Photo: ntv.ru
We live in a time with ''high acidity''. We, the citizens of the Russian Federation, should be in constant vigilance, in order, noting any actions of suspicious persons, to inform the law enforcement officials in time. Of course, this man will be dealt with — who is he, where from, what were the motives, but at the moment it just shows that technical security is just a tool, not an end in itself. It has confirmed my belief again.
How free is the access to the FSB buildings?
The FSB buildings is one thing, and the receiving office — the other. Here people come in order to make any statements. There are technical means of control. But he entered the room and he opened fire before the control. Well, what else can we do? To build barricades around the office and put some bunkers for passage? After all, the goal of the office is to provide unimpeded access for citizens to enable them to make a statement. With minimal protective functions.
Nothing strange is in this. We can't guess what and where it will happen. Such ''dude'' appeared in Khabarovsk, and he made a demonstrative action. With the same success it could be Izhevsk, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, Kazan and so on. That is, any city where there are law enforcement agencies and their receiving offices and in which, as in other cities, there are discontent people, with aggressive intentions.
I think today we should increase vigilance of our people, who could at an early stage to warn the power structures about an inappropriate behaviour of a particular person.
''The issue of strengthening must account for any peak loads associated with the terrorist danger. When we keep strengthening, especially when something has already happened, it looks ridiculous.'' Photo: polit.info
Should we expect a strengthening of security measures?
Law enforcement authorities cannot work in the mode of strengthening all the time. Well, people cannot work 12 hours seven days a week, and sometimes even around the clock. The issue of strengthening must account for any peak loads associated with a terrorist danger. When we keep strengthening, especially when something has already happened, it looks ridiculous.
Any reinforcement is a signal to criminals to keep a low profile. I am constantly outraged when about strengthening they warn in advance. An employee of the Moscow GUVD suddenly recently announced that the FSB will carry out the operation Anaconda, which he said will end on May 11. Any normal attacker will take a trip to Turkey or Egypt and until May 11 will lay on the beaches and bask in the rays of the sun. It all has demonstrative, convivial nature. A strengthening should be done suddenly and secretly because otherwise we lose surprise effect.